Raids, sanctions and utility cut-offs are putting scam hubs under pressure – but operators adapt quickly, shifting sites and routes to stay ahead
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Efforts to root out the scam centres take place within a context of lawlessness, violence and, to some extent, state acquiescence. Nevertheless, interventions have been stepped up and illegal operations are beginning to feel the heat.
A surge in crimes targeting Chinese citizens, the disappearance of citizens trafficked into scam dens, and high-profile cases of celebrities being duped into working at scam centres prompted a public outcry – and intervention by the Chinese authorities. Cross-border coordination on law enforcement between Thailand, Myanmar and China has been growing, along with enforcement between Cambodia and China.
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One case that crystallised the issue was that of Wang Xing (also known by his stage name, Xing Xing), a Chinese actor who disappeared after travelling to Thailand and was found on 7 January 2025 near the Myanmar border in an area where online scam networks operate. Thai police said he was a victim of human trafficking.
Wang told police he had been lured by the promise of a casting job with a major Thai entertainment company, but was instead taken across the border into Myanmar, where he was put to work in a call-scam operation targeting Chinese people.
He described being held with around 50 others in one building, and said all had their heads shaved, with a larger building holding even more people from different countries. His ordeal triggered a wave of online pleas from families of other missing Chinese nationals and prompted wider fears about trafficking routes that run through Thailand to scam compounds over the border.
China’s anti-fraud campaign began in 2023, since when more than 53,000 Chinese nationals suspected of involvement in frauds have been arrested and repatriated.
The past 18 months have seen a steady stream of state-controlled media reports announcing that various scam centres have been eradicated. In late 2024, for example, China’s Xinhua news agency reported that China’s and Myanmar’s law enforcement agencies had ‘wiped out’ all large-scale telecom fraud centres operating in northern Myanmar, amid 700 arrests.
A potential game-changer, in Cambodia at least, came in January this year with the arrest and extradition to China of Chen Zhi, chairman of Cambodia’s Prince Group, a real estate, banking and construction company.
At the time of writing, it was unclear what charges Chen faced, but last year he was indicted by US authorities with wire fraud and money laundering connected to online scamming operations. Prosecutors seized US$15billion in bitcoin linked to Chen and designated his group a ‘transnational criminal network’, although he has denied any wrongdoing. The UK simultaneously imposed sanctions against the Cambodian firm, freezing 19 London properties worth more than £100million.
Thailand is also increasing its actions against the cybercrime syndicates. At the start of 2026, it cut electricity, internet and fuel supplies to key crime hubs in Myanmar.
According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), Thai police have also made attempts – so far unsuccessful – to obtain an arrest warrant for Chit Thu, the leader of the Myanmar military’s Border Guard Force (BGF) – also known as the Karen National Army. GI-TOC cites the BGF as ‘the primary partner and security umbrella for Chinese illicit businesses in the Myanmar–Thailand borderlands’.
Towards the end of 2025, The Irrawaddy reported that the Burmese junta said it had sealed off 101 of the 135 buildings in Shwe Kokko, detaining more than 2,000 foreigners and seizing more than 3,000 computers, 20,000 mobile phones and other equipment. It also claimed to have demolished 270 of 635 buildings at KK Park.
Such high-profile interventions do have an impact, argues British cybercrime researcher Xu Peng, but she is unconvinced that they are enough and points out that, despite releasing tens of thousands of trafficked workers from these compounds, the raids have done little to wipe out scam operations.
‘In Cambodia, it can be brought under control, but in Myanmar, it is harder – the landlords are the army and rebel groups; they control everything and rely on the farms to make money,’ she says. ‘Their assets are human resources rather than commodities such as drugs. You can move people easily. They know before any crackdown happens; they’re already on the move, another site just rises up. China has been persuading scammers to return home – that does work, but it does not dismantle the farms.’
While China now tracks cross-border money transfers, and Chinese smartphones must have anti-fraud apps installed, Peng argues that all this does is force scam-centre operations to locate further away from the Chinese border. ‘Cyber scam operations are high profit and low risk, compared to other types of crime,’ adds Kristina Amerhauser of GI-TOC. ‘Sometimes they also come back once the dust has settled.’
‘It’s not down to one country to sort this out,’ says Peng. ‘This has to involve international cooperation. Greater awareness-raising in the West and China, and more moves by banks to flag up the risks of bank transfers, will make potential victims better informed,’ she argues. ‘People are only scammed when they click the “send” button on a payment – that’s the major area to focus on.’
The global systems that facilitate such scams need to be addressed, argues Amerhauser. ‘They are not just a result of criminal creativity, but are a consequence of systemic complicity, regulatory gaps and fragmented enforcement,’ she says. ‘We need to address its key drivers and enablers: corruption, illicit finance, the role of technology and businesses… otherwise we risk displacing the problem.’
