
China is both target and driver: domestic outrage fuels enforcement, while the crackdown helps project power along Myanmar’s and Thailand’s borders
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China is the central paradox in the story of the scam farms. Beijing is pushing Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand to shut them down, yet many of the syndicates that run the compounds have roots in China and operate through Chinese-linked networks and quasi-legal businesses. Analysts suspect China’s crackdown is driven as much by domestic outrage as by law enforcement – and that Beijing is using the scam-centre crisis to extend its leverage, expand its security footprint and reshape regional geopolitics in its favour.
Check out our related reads on scam farms…
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The US–China Economic and Security Review Commission reported in July 2025 that Chinese criminals behind scam centres have ‘built ties – some overt, some deniable – to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas’.
As a result, the commission argued, ‘Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government… China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the Mekong region.’
China has directly influenced the civil–military conflicts within Myanmar. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China supported the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to launch a major offensive.
When China realised the MNDAA had made such significant military gains that there was a realistic chance of regime change, it struck a bargain with the Myanmar junta: in exchange for holding back the MNDAA and its allies, Beijing demanded greater cooperation from the regime to tackle the cyber-scam issue. IISS says China’s security footprint has now been able to expand into southern Myanmar along the border with Thailand – an area where Beijing has historically held little to no sway.
According to a 2025 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime report, China’s responses have been crafted ‘with two objectives in mind: to generate the media coverage needed to respond to domestic pressure triggered by trafficking and scamming of Chinese nationals; and to extract political and economic concessions from Thailand’.
The latter has concerns about the United Wa State Army, a Myanmar-based group that occupies land claimed by Thailand. All this gives ‘China leverage over Thailand on critical bilateral issues’, according to the IISS. ‘Senior officers in the Thai army share the assessment that China is selectively using the scam issue to gain influence in the region and in Thailand.’ That heft includes the repatriation of Uyghur refugees and the placement of Chinese police in the Thai border city of Mae Sot, extending Chinese influence into northern Thailand.
According to the GI-TOC report, China is also using the scam centres as a means to deepen cooperation around the Global Security Initiative, China’s homegrown framework for international policing and its vision for a reformed world order that isn’t led by the USA and the West and which – not coincidentally – would help protect Chinese overseas interests.




